The military, economic, political, and legal strategy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region

 

Note. Adapted from "Commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage: routes, resources, governance, technology, and infrastructure," by Scott Stephenson, Michal Czub, Linking Chen, and Albert Buixadé Farré, 2014, Polar Geography, ResearchGate.

By: Marco Roncagliolo

The Arctic is a word that comes from the Greek "Artikos," which means bear. After global warming increased the planet's temperature from the 19th to the 21st century, the reduction of sea ice in the Arctic opened up new opportunities for accessing energy resources, mostly located in the Russian region. Additionally, the opening of the Northwest Passage connects different parts of the world, significantly reducing navigation time and shipping costs for various goods and energy resources. The Arctic provides Russia with 20% of its GDP and 90% of its hydrocarbon reserves, primarily located in the far north and east of Siberia. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev's government viewed the Arctic as a zone of cooperation and peace. With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the Arctic lost its strategic and military value for Russia. This changed in 2000 when Vladimir Putin assumed power, and military security in the region became of paramount importance.

In response to Russia's increased interest in the Arctic, Dmitry Medvedev's government approved in 2008 the "Basic Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation for the Arctic until 2020 and beyond," prioritizing four interests: the development of natural resources, maintaining peace and cooperation, protecting the environment, and transforming the Northwest Passage. This was followed by an update of the previous strategy during Vladimir Putin's government, approved in March 2020, called "Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2035," which added two additional interests: defending national security and maintaining high living standards for the population.

To achieve the objectives outlined in the 2020 and 2035 strategies, Russian strategies have been divided into four categories: military, economic, political, and legal, aiming to expand their influence over the Arctic. The military strategy seeks to expand maneuverability using the Northern Fleet through war simulations and various military exercises. Additionally, the modernization of military bases enhances their military capacity, as seen with the base known as the Arctic Trébol. Similarly, the Iceberg Project utilizes cutting-edge technology in hydrocarbon development. The Coast Guard monitors maritime transportation and economic activities in the region. Furthermore, the nuclear corporation Rosatom manages the commercial maritime route along with icebreakers that facilitate global maritime trade.

Regarding the economic strategy, it aims to utilize natural resources as income for the local economy. In the Arctic, Russia has 200 deposits in the Barents Sea, the Pechora Sea, and the Kara Sea, representing 77% of the country's hydrocarbon resources. Additionally, Russia is the second-largest exporter of oil and the largest producer and exporter of natural gas globally. The region also holds mineral deposits, accounting for 17.7% of exports, mainly located in Russian regions. The Arctic routes are crucial for 90% of international trade, with the Northwest Passage being used for liquefied natural gas transportation. China has shown concern about the region due to its dependence on maritime traffic, initiating its interest in the Arctic in 2012 and launching the Polar Silk Road in 2018 to connect Asia with Europe.

Furthermore, Russia's political strategy focuses on presence and prestige. Russia's presidency of the Arctic Council enables it to project its interests abroad, aiming to reactivate military chief of staff meetings and summits for international cooperation. Additionally, Russia seeks selective normalization with the West and non-restriction of natural resource exploitation. International cooperation between Russia and China has increased since Crimea's annexation in 2014, with China becoming an observer member of the Arctic Council in 2013 and investing over $435 billion in natural resource extraction projects in the Russian Arctic.

We also have Russia's legal strategy in the Arctic, which seeks to consolidate the extension of its continental shelf, as mentioned in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Russia claims the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea, the Bering Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk, as well as the Lomonosov Ridge, as an extension of its territory before the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, but the Commission requested clarification. In 2015, Russia resubmitted its claim beyond the 200-mile limit. Part of the claims include the Lomonosov Ridge, parts of which were also claimed by Canada in 2013 and Denmark in 2014. The same applies in the Barents Sea, where in the 1970s there was a dispute over fishing rights and oil fields that ended in a division between Russia and Norway in 2010 and joint management of hydrocarbons and fisheries between the two countries. The other dispute is over the Bering Sea, which dates back to 1867 and continued between the USSR and the USA in 1977 until they signed an agreement in 1990. Although the US Congress has ratified the agreement, the Russian Duma has not. However, both Russia and the USA implement the agreed content.

In summary, climate change has caused the melting of the Arctic region, opening opportunities for access to natural resources and the emergence of new commercial shipping routes. Russia's interest in the Arctic has varied since the 1980s when the region was conceived with a vision of cooperation and peace, and since 2000, national security has become a central element. All of this comes at a time when Russia seeks to have a greater military presence to defend its national sovereignty and monitor and control its sphere of influence. The region holds a significant portion of the country's energy resources such as oil, natural gas, and minerals, as well as an alternative route for their transportation. Russia's presidency of the Arctic Council signifies a dual discourse focused on cooperation and militarization. International cooperation with China focuses on interest in natural resources and the existence of a route for its products to access the international market. Arctic countries have long initiated claims over their continental shelves that overlap with Russia's and have led to negotiations and agreements between the parties. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out whether there will be the possibility of conflict over resources or territory, or whether dialogue and cooperation will prevail.

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